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For the first time in a decade, a united Hungarian opposition to Viktor Orbán and
his Fidesz party has a real chance of winning the next national election, slated for
April 2022. But even if the opposition can succeed on a tilted playing field, new
obstacles will emerge when it tries to govern. Orbán has created a system that
locks in Fidesz’s power as long as his party hangs onto a mere one-third of the
parliamentary seats, and not even the most optimistic members of the opposition
imagine Orbán falling that far.
A Legal Lockdown
As things stand now, then, the opposition is trapped in Orbán’s constitutional
prison if they play by Orbán’s rules. An absolute two-thirds majority is required to
change the constitution and a relative two-thirds majority is required to change the
huge number of “cardinal laws” that set in legal stone everything from the exact
boundaries of election districts that will stymie election law reform to the definition of
public funds that puts beyond public accountability the massive state assets recently
transferred into private foundations run by Orbán’s loyalists. Anything Orbán cares
about has been deliberately majority-proofed so that it can only be legally changed
by an opposition supermajority that is out of reach under Orbán’s election laws.
Moreover, Orbán has entrenched his own party loyalists in crucial chokepoints in the
constitutional order. The republic president’s term happens to end just before the
next election, allowing the Fidesz supermajority to replace him with one of their own.
A Fidesz president can refer any law passed by the new Parliament to the packed
Constitutional Court to stall or block its enactment and he can refuse any new judicial
appointment. A new Fidesz-faithful Supreme Court president was parachuted into
office on 1 January 2021 for a nine-year term after the two-thirds law written just
for him passed the Parliament with only Fidesz votes. The new law allowed the
new Supreme Court president to bypass the normal requirements for the job while
giving him many new judgeships to fill and the power to select the particular judges
to hear each case once he was installed in office. The loyal public prosecutor had
consistently failed to prosecute even very visible corruption by Fidesz officials before
he was reelected in 2020 for a nine-year term. And, according to recent changes in
the law, his replacement can only be elected by a two-thirds majority. Not enough
constitutional judges will rotate off the Constitutional Court during the term of the
next government to undo the Fidesz lock on the institution.
Any victorious opposition, then, is faced with a legal situation in which significant
change has been deliberately denied to them, requiring them to govern from inside
Orbán’s legal prison. If the opposition wins a mere majority in the Parliament, its
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political will can be blocked by Orbán’s legacy laws and hand-picked guardians.
As this symposium demonstrates, a debate has arisen over whether the opposition
would be justified in breaking out of this system by breaking Orbán’s laws.
A Way Out
What can be done? An answer lies in plain sight: Embrace European law as
Hungary has already pledged to do.
Hungary is a member of the European Union and the Council of Europe. It joined
the Council of Europe in 1990, ratified the European Convention on Human Rights
in 1992 and incorporated the Convention into Hungarian Law in Act XXXI of 1993.
Hungary acceded to the European Union in 2004, after a 2003 referendum saw
85% of Hungarians vote to join. Both the Council of Europe and the European Union
impose legal obligations on Hungary. While Hungary’s legal obligations under the
ECHR and EU Treaties should have acted as a bulwark against backsliding, neither
the COE nor the EU intervened forcefully enough to ensure that Hungary upheld
those obligations. Even if European institutions had been more inclined to act,
however, the Orbán government made clear it would thwart all efforts to constrain
it. Despite having fallen out of the family of constitutional democracies, Hungary still
has European legal obligations. Even if European law did not prevent Hungary’s
slide into autocracy, it can be used to bring Hungary back into compliance with
European values now.
For Hungarian law formalists who are concerned about violating existing Hungarian
law to restore the rule of law, embracing European law provides a way out of
Orbán’s legal lockdown. Under Article 7(2) of the 1989 Hungarian Constitution, which
was in effect when both the ECHR and EU Treaties were brought into Hungarian
law, domesticating major treaties generally required a two-thirds vote of Parliament.
Even if the EU Treaties and the ECHR were treated merely as domestic law without
the additional force that international law brings, then, they would pose a conflict-of-
laws problem within Hungarian law. Domestically speaking, they are two-thirds laws
that are now contradicted by Orbán’s two-thirds laws.
How can this conflict-of-laws problem be resolved? The Fundamental Law is clear.
Treaties take priority over statutes regardless of whether the statutes are ordinary
majority laws or supermajority cardinal laws. The current Fundamental Law specifies
in Article Q(2) that “Hungary shall ensure that Hungarian law is in conformity with
international law in order to comply with its obligations under international law.” The
Constitutional Court is given the competence in Article 24(f) of the Fundamental
Law of “examining the conformity of national legislation with international treaties.”
Hungary acknowledges its obligations to follow EU law in particular in Fundamental
Law, Article E2 (about which more later). The Hungarian Constitutional Court has,
throughout its history, consistently put international law above national statutes. In a
conflict between a treaty and a statute, then, the treaty prevails under Hungarian law
even without the additional push that the primacy of EU law adds to this conclusion.
Moreover, the interpretation of treaties, according to Act L of 2005 on International
Agreements, Article 13(1) requires that “The interpretation of the international treaty
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[in Hungarian domestic law] shall also take into account the decisions of the body
having jurisdiction to resolve disputes relating to that international treaty.” Decisions
of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights must
therefore be considered as interpretive guides in Hungarian law for what those treaty
provisions mean.
As a result, if a Hungarian statute – including a two-thirds “cardinal law” – conflicts
with a treaty, then the treaty prevails. Of course, for EU Treaties, EU law requires
this result. But so does Hungarian law all by itself, so that the principle extends to the
ECHR.
Two-Thirds Treaties over Two-Thirds Laws
A new Parliament could turn a new legal page in Hungary by confirming that, on
its watch, all legal obligations arising under the EU Treaties and the ECHR (or
international law more generally when it has been domesticated in Hungarian law)
will take priority over contrary statutes, as indeed the Fundamental Law requires.
In short, a new Parliament could simply highlight what is already true in Hungarian
law, which is that international agreements take precedence over statutes, including
cardinal laws.
Under this theory, a new Hungarian Parliament could begin by bringing into
compliance with European law all conflicting national laws. When national statutes
conflict with EU law, the process could begin by “disapplying” those laws that can
only be changed by a two-thirds majority. Disapplication means, at a minimum, that
no court or state authority may apply those laws any longer, an obligation deriving
directly from EU law. But the principle of disapplying national law in the face of
conflicting international law extends more broadly throughout Hungarian law, since
Act L of 2005 on International Agreements in Article 13(1) requires all national courts
to directly apply the ECHR and judgments of the Strasbourg court, among others.
While decisions of the European Court of Justice affect the applicability of the
national laws, however, the EU cannot reach the validity of conflicting laws. The
laws would therefore remain formally in effect. All those conflicting laws that could be
changed by a simple majority should then be changed because EU law obliges the
Member State to take action to nullify them. But if the Hungarian Parliament were to
say that it cannot change a two-thirds law with its mere majority, the ECJ would no
doubt respond (as it has already said in Simmenthal, Factortame, and Lucchini) that
the national rules blocking compliance with EU law must also be changed. In such
a situation, the Hungarian Parliament could justify changing two-thirds laws by a
simple majority because it must to do so to comply with EU law. With regard to laws
that conflict with other sources of international obligations, like the ECHR, the new
Parliament could cite Fundamental Law Article Q(2) as the basis for nullifying even
cardinal statutes by simple majority, when they are inconsistent with international
law.
Having determined to bring Hungarian law into line with European law, what could
a new Hungarian Parliament do concretely, then? It might start by complying with
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the infringements brought by the European Commission and confirmed by the
Court of Justice specifically with regard to Hungary and then take note of pending
infringements and warnings from EU institutions that Hungary remains in violation of
EU law so that Hungary can get out ahead of these problems. The Sargentini Report
of the European Parliament triggering Article 7 TEU provides just one such list.
Finally, the new Hungarian Parliament could work through the implications of Court
of Justice judgments in cases involving other Member States that should raise red
flags about parallel laws in Hungary. It should do the same with ECtHR judgments,
first bringing Hungary into compliance with adverse ruling in the Hungarian cases,
then assessing what the rest of the ECtHR case law implies for Hungarian laws on
the books.
The most crucial areas to begin with are recovering judicial independence,
dismantling the surveillance state, restoring the freedom of civil society and rooting
out corruption, all of which have plenty of European law to use.
Restoring Judicial Independence
As we have learned in a set of ECJ cases involving Portugal, Poland and Romania,
maintaining an independent judiciary is a requirement for Member States under EU
law. A new Hungarian Parliament should set about amending Hungary’s laws on
the judiciary to bring it into compliance with EU law. Using EU law to disapply the
conflicting laws would dispose of the two-thirds supermajority problem, after which
changes to the laws on the judiciary could be passed by the new Parliament with a
simple majority.
EU law might even be interpreted to permit particular personnel changes that would
otherwise pose challenges for the rule of law. In case C-286/12, the ECJ found
that retirement age for judges and notaries was unlawfully lowered in 2012. The
new positions that were unlawfully opened up in consequence were therefore filled
illegally because the positions were not in fact open. At the time, the European
Commission demanded that the prematurely fired judges be reinstated in their prior
positions, but, because the Orbán government delayed responding until all of the
posts were filled before even pretending to comply, the Commission eventually
settled for a mere change in the law to raise the retirement age for the Orbán-
appointed new judges. The case is therefore closed. But could a new Parliament
revisit those judicial appointments and replace the illegally appointed judges with
new ones? It would be enforcing that earlier ECJ decision, not breaking Hungarian
law to do so. Alternatively, a new Hungarian Parliament could rely on the April
2021 ECJ judgment in the Repubblika case, which announced the principle of non-
retrogression from EU values, to revisit the changes that the Orbán government
made to the judiciary with the goal of restoring judicial independence.
The new Parliament should comply with the most recent ECJ judgment on Hungary
(Case 564/19, decided on 21 November 2021), confirming that national judges may
not declare reference questions irrelevant or closed before a decision of the ECJ and
that the judges who made such references may not be punished for sending them.
Again, the courts should immediately disapply the two-thirds laws that permitted
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these disciplinary measures to occur, which would clear the ground for Parliament to
enact simple-majority laws in their place.
If one adds in the ECtHR jurisprudence, we might consider the case involving the
unlawful dismissal of Supreme Court President András Baka in 2011, a case which
is still unresolved. Judge Baka fell victim to a sudden change in job qualifications
that singled him out for removal for political reasons (as the ECtHR found). To
make matters worse, the same thing has just happened again, only in reverse.
The new president of the Supreme Court who took office at the start of 2021 was
installed in that position because the government again changed the qualifications
for office to single him out. Otherwise, he would have been unqualified for the job.
Hungary could comply with the ECtHR judgment in the Baka case by regularizing
the qualifications and procedures for filling the presidency of the Supreme Court,
starting with a recognition of the fact that a sudden mirror-image change in the
qualifications to put an otherwise unqualified judge into that office is no more lawful
than the original sudden change of qualifications to remove a qualified judge from
that office. Removing the current president of the Supreme Court on the grounds that
his appointment violated ECHR law would also address the concerns of the Council
of Europe’s Venice Commission over the procedure through which he was selected.
This is just a beginning, but it shows how both EU and ECHR law could be used to
reform the judiciary, which was severely compromised under Orbán’s reign. Puppet
judges could be removed and political independence could be restored – all through
legislation prioritizing treaty obligations over other two-thirds laws.
Dismantling the Surveillance State
One could use European and ECtHR law to dismantle the surveillance state that
Fidesz has created to monitor the opposition and gather compromising information
on anyone that the government might want to tarnish.
A new Parliament might start by revisiting the unlawful termination of the data
protection ombudsman in 2011 and his replacement by a Fidesz loyalist, who
was just reappointed in 2020 for another nine-year term. The Court of Justice
found in C-288/12 that the premature termination of the prior data protection
ombudsman’s term violated the independence required of that office and the
Commission demanded some (unspecified) remedy from Hungary. The Commission
at the time missed the opportunity to investigate why the data protection ombudsman
had been fired, which was for bringing legal action – as he was obligated by EU
law to do – against the Hungarian government for collecting personally identifiable
political opinions of its citizens through “national consultations.”
The non-independence of the national data protection authority that replaced him
has become clear because, in 10 years, the new data protection authority blew the
whistle on nothing as the powers of the surveillance state grew. He said nothing
about the “national consultations” that the government has continued to run to this
day, nor about the unlimited surveillance capacities of the TEK (Anti-Terrorism
Police) even after the European Court of Human Rights found that the TEK’s powers
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violated the Convention rights of those spied on. Nor did he say anything about the
creation of a far-reaching facial recognition system, and he has still said nothing
about the use of Pegasus spyware against journalists. Removing a data protection
official who was illegally appointed in the first place would be acting in the spirit of
European law, not violating it. A new data protection ombudsman could begin the
process of dismantling the wholesale collection of private and sensitive information
by the government, following both EU law and ECtHR decisions on data privacy and
using EU and ECHR data protection law as a guide.
Restoring Freedom of the Civil Sector
In a free and democratic society, civil society groups should be able to operate
without being monitored, criminalized or shut down by the state. Decision C-78/18
of the ECJ found unlawful Hungary’s statute requiring civil society associations to
disclose all foreign sources of funds and to publicly label themselves as foreign
agents when their income from foreign sources exceeded a rather small amount.
Surely the new law allegedly “complying” with this decision that now requires the
Fidesz-controlled State Audit Office to audit the books and publish the finances
of all civil sector organizations is not in keeping with the spirit of that decision.
Disapplying this new law would free the civil sector to act independently without state
interference. In addition, a new Parliament could also ensure that it complied with
the ECJ decision in Case C-821/19, which requires decriminalizing the activities of
civil society groups that assist refugees. Religious organizations deprived of their
status as registered churches could have their rights restored if a new Hungarian
Parliament complied with the 2014 ECtHR decision in Magyar Keresztény Mennonita
Egyház v. Hungary. 
Fighting corruption
Since the passage of the Conditionality Regulation, which permits the European
Commission (with approval of the Council) to cut funds to EU Member States whose
rule of law violations put EU funds at risk, anti-corruption measures are required
under Union law as a condition of receiving EU funds. This would require sweeping
reforms to the judiciary, public prosecutor’s office, procurement and audit offices
and more. Hungary has so far not received any of its allocated money under the
Recovery Fund because the Commission has not been satisfied that Hungary
has guaranteed the conditions for proper spending of EU money due to systemic
problems that have produced multiple negative assessments from EU stakeholders.
The EU has pointed repeatedly to the lack of high-level prosecutions of those
affiliated with the governing party despite repeated OLAF findings of problems with
corruption. To comply with EU law and receive the funds, a new Parliament would
have to – among other things – reform the office of the public prosecutor. A new
Parliament could also vote to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and urge
all those with evidence of corruption to take their evidence there – including evidence
about the corruption of the current public prosecutor’s office itself.
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All of these measures would harmonize Hungarian law with European law, by
acknowledging the supremacy of EU law, Hungary’s ECHR treaty obligations
and those provisions of domestic law that reinforce both. In cases where national
law violates European law, the Parliament would be justified in setting aside the
conflicting national law, even when those laws are two-thirds laws. The constitutional
problem of changing two-thirds laws with a simple-majority Parliament can be
overcome if the jurisprudence of the ECJ requiring Member States to remove
barriers to the enforcement of EU law can be used to dismantle the legal structures
within Hungary that prevent the realization of EU law.
The Constitutional Conundrum
What, you might ask, about the Fundamental Law? So far, we have discussed
statutes that violate treaty obligations, but the Hungarian constitution stands
above both and the constitution hedges its bets on European law. A constitutional
amendment in 2018 signaled that the Hungarian government was not ready to
acknowledge the automatic supremacy of EU law – with the changed text in italics:
Article E(2): In its role as a Member State of the European Union and by
virtue of international treaty, Hungary may – to the extent necessary for
exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations stemming from the Founding
Treaties – exercise certain competences deriving from the Fundamental
Law, together with the other Member States, through the institutions
of the European Union. The exercise of powers under this Paragraph
must be consistent with the fundamental rights and freedoms set out in
the Fundamental Law, and it must not be allowed to restrict Hungary’s
inalienable right of disposition relating to its territorial integrity, population,
political system and form of governance.
Article R(4) was added to the Fundamental Law at the same time to bolster the point:
Each and every body of the State shall be obliged to protect the
constitutional identity and the Christian culture of Hungary.
The italicized parts of Article E(2)drew a red line that the EU may not cross with
regard to Hungary, putting Hungary’s decisions about its territorial integrity,
population, political system and form of governance beyond the EU’s reach. Even
before the constitutional amendment passed, the Constitutional Court defended
Orbán’s defiance of the EU in its decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB, by claiming that it
had the power to review EU acts to assess whether they were in compliance with
the rights provisions of the Hungarian constitution, whether they stayed within the
boundaries of conferred powers (ultra vires review) and whether they respected
Hungarian sovereignty. After the constitutional amendment passed, providing the
additional ground of national identity review, the Court issued another decision in
2019, 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB, in which it dutifully warned the EU away from interfering
with its homogeneous population. From this, it would appear that the Constitutional
Court will be the biggest obstacle in trying to reform Hungarian law through
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European law, asserting that it is the final interpreter not only of the Fundamental
Law but also of all international agreements subordinate to it.
But there are two ways to get around an obstructionist Court. First, the Constitutional
Court itself seems to be wondering about the wisdom of a confrontation with the EU
so it might just change once the Parliament does. Second, we can use European law
to disable the Court.
The Constitutional Court in its decision of 11 December 2021, X/477/2021, available
here, just backed down from a direct assault on the primary of EU law. Justice
Minister Judit Varga had asked the Court whether she was required to follow the
ECJ’s decision in Case C-808/18 requiring Hungary to allow asylum-seekers to wait
inside Hungary for the processing of their cases. She argued that the constitutional
identity provisions pertaining to territory and population meant she could disregard
the ECJ decision. But the Court sidestepped the question, claiming that a concrete
question about a specific case could not be asked through an abstract review
petition and therefore ruling that it did not have jurisdiction.
The Court wavered even more in its willingness to follow the government into a
direct standoff with the European Union when it relied heavily on a set of its own
prior decisions made when a still-independent Court was resisting being packed by
Orbán. The Court even cited one of its own cases from before the new constitution
went into effect, defying the Fidesz Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law
which barred the Court from relying on any cases decided under the old Constitution.
  In this crucial case for the government, then, the Court was defiantly citing cases
in which the Court stood up to Orbán. For those who knew how to read between the
lines in that citation pattern, the cases that the Court chose to rely on seemed to be
declaring independence.
In addition, the Court is now supposed to consider Hungary’s historic constitution,
but in this case the Court relied on a poignant piece of that history: St. Stephen’s
admonition to his son Imre. St. Stephen is, of course, Hungary’s first Christian
king, crowned by the Pope, who, according to the constitutional preamble, “set the
Hungarian State on solid foundations, and made our country a part of Christian
Europe.” The Constitutional Court opinion doesn’t quote the admonition but every
Hungarian knows it by heart:
For a country of one single language and one set of customs is weak
and vulnerable. Therefore I enjoin on you, my son, to protect newcomers
benevolently and to hold them in high esteem so that they should stay with
your rather than dwell elsewhere.
If Judit Varga wanted an answer to her question of whether asylum seekers should
be able to remain in Hungary, there it was. So, the Court may have already decided
that honoring EU law is wise at this point.
Suppose, however, that the Constitutional Court hardens its approach when a new
Parliament comes to power and it doubles down on enforcing the Orbán constitution
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Orbán’s way, citing Article E(2) of the Fundamental Law. There are two approaches
open to the new Parliament.
First, the Parliament, as a body entitled to ask for abstract review from the
Constitutional Court, could send EU-law-violating Hungarian statutes to the
Constitutional Court for review, with requests that the Constitutional Court send
references to the ECJ for confirmation of whether the spotlighted laws are in violation
of EU law. The Parliament could even draft the questions it would like for the ECJ
to answer. Would the Constitutional Court dare refuse the direct request to make
a reference? And then, would it dare to refuse the answer that was returned from
Luxembourg?
If the Constitutional Court dug in further and decided to block either references or
the orderly harmonization of Hungarian law with its international legal obligations,
the Parliament could stand behind a test case that could be taken to the ECtHR
for a decision, citing the Xero Flor judgment that found Poland’s Constitutional
Tribunal was not a “tribunal established by law.” In that case, the ECtHR set out
standards that any court – including a constitutional court – must meet in order to
remain independent, citing in particular the absence of “undue interference by the
executive or the legislature with the judiciary” (para. 276) as the crucial point. The
petitioner to the ECtHR would argue that when the Fidesz government changed
the rule in 2010, with votes of only its own party, to allow itself to appoint all judges
to the Constitutional Court without any support from the political opposition, and
then simultaneously expanded the number of judges on the bench, the Fidesz
government was politicizing the Court by packing it. The Hungarian government has
since appointed party loyalists to the bench and the Court has acted largely as the
government has wished, with few exceptions. But if the Polish Constitutional Tribunal
is no longer properly constituted because it was captured and packed, neither is
the Hungarian Constitutional Court by the same standard. If the European Court of
Human Rights would say so, just as it did in Poland, then a new Parliament would be
justified in simply ignoring decisions of this Court. Or in dismantling it.
As András Jakab has said elsewhere in this symposium, however, many of those
who have done Orbán’s dirty work all these years really don’t believe in the cause.
They are opportunists who will switch sides if the Parliament changes hands. And it’s
best to give them time and space to do it. The deep state may not be as deep as it
looks.
In fact, I think that this new Constitutional Court decision on 11 December already
shows that he’s right. At least some judges in the Court see the end of Orbán’s reign
coming, and they don’t want to be on the wrong side of either history or politics. In
the end, I believe that the Court will bend rather than break, especially when given
good legal reasons to do so. If a new Hungarian Parliament sets about harmonizing
Hungarian law with its European legal obligations, the Constitutional Court will surely
see that there are European legal avenues through which it can be simply bypassed
and fall into line.
Backsliding democracies around the world all face the problem of how to restore the
rule of law. Precisely because it is already embedded in European law, with deep
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Hungarian roots that have long honored European traditions and its international law
obligations, Hungary has the option of simply embracing European law to provide a
legal path back to the rule of law.
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